OSGOOD'S STRUGGLE AGAINST THE UMWA
by
Darrell Munsell

John C Osgood’s grand experiment in industrial paternalism came to an end in 1909 when the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company (CF&I) closed the mining and coking operations at Coalbasin and Redstone.  The village of Redstone quickly became deserted and Osgood infrequently returned until 1925, when he and his third wife moved back to Clevehohm (Redstone Castle).  Suffering from cancer, Osgood devoted the last few months of his life to the restoration of his beloved village to the state that it had been in 1909. 

Osgood, now 70 years old

Although he still had the resources to accomplish this goal, he had not the time.  Thus, Redstone, like the industrial policy which it had been erected as a symbol, languished in the pages of history.

Although Osgood lost control of CF&I to John D Rockefeller and George Gould in 1903, he retained possession of several important firms, including Victor and American Fuel Companies.  In 1909 Osgood, the principal stock owner of both companies, combined them to form the Victor-American Fuel Company.  The company owned several coal mines and coke ovens in southern Colorado and New Mexico.  From this base of operations, Osgood soon became the chief competitor to CF&I in the supply of fuel in the western region.  Lamont M Bowers, vice president of CF&I in the supply of fuel in the western region.  Lamont M Bowers, vice president of CF&I, complained to John D Rockefeller, Jr. that Osgood used unethical methods such as short-weighing his miners’ coal production in order to gain a larger share of the fuel market.  Even though he despised Osgood, Bowers found commonality with him in the hatred of unionism.

Throughout his career in the coal industry, from Iowa to Colorado, Osgood fought the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA).  Labor militancy and unionism become a major threat to both the hard rock and coal mine operators by the late nineteenth century.  Strikes became ever more frequent and the list of union demands more extensive.  The 1901 strike prompted Osgood to undertake his ambitious program of industrial paternalism throughout the CF&I camps and mills as the best way to counter unionism.  Although Osgood made several concessions to the workers to end the strike, his refusal  to recognize or deal with the UMWA and his withdrawal of the concessions previously made were major issues in the 1903-04 strike.  This strike occurred at the time that Osgood lost control of CF&I to Rockefeller-Gould combination and is best remembered as Colorado’s war on the militant Western Federation of Miners (WFM) with the major battles in the metalliferous camps of Cripple Creek and Idaho Springs. Governor James Peabody’s deployment of the National Guard troops enabled the mine owners to bring in strikebreakers, dealing a fatal blow to the WFM and causing a devastating setback for the UMWA.

Many of the strikebreakers of 1903 became the strikers in 1913.  Over the years since 1904 the UMWA gradually recovered, and, notwithstanding the major assault by Osgood and many of the other mine owners upon union organizations, gained substantial support in the coal camps of southern Colorado.  Such longstanding grievances as short weights and the absence of check-weighmen, use of scrip (company money redeemable only at company stores), restrictions on trade with independent merchants, failure to increase wages to keep up with the cost of living, and blacklisting of union members induced  increasing number of miners to join the union.   In 1913 the UMWA supplemented this list of grievances in their strike notice with specific demands for the recognition of the UMWA as the legitimate bargaining agent for the mine workers, an eight-hour day pay for dead work (timbering, laying of rails, removing rock). abolition of mine guards and the enforcement of Colorado mining laws.  In late August the union officials appealed to the United States Department of Labor and Governor Elias Ammons to arrange a conference with them and the leading coal operators to mediate the labor dispute.  When the operators refused all offers of mediation, the union called the works out on strike on September 23, 1913.

At the first hint of a strike, the Mine Owner’s Association appointed a policy committee consisting of the chief officials of the three largest coal companies: Osgood of Victor-American, Jesse Welborn of CF&I, and David Brown of Rocky Mountain Fuel Company.  Although Welborn as president of CF&I received more publicity than the other two, it was Osgood who dominated the committee.  Rabidly antiunion, inflexible, and oblivious to the consequences of his actions for others, Osgood had been the principal spokesman for the coal operators since his days with CF&I.  Osgood’s cardinal rule of never meeting with union officials was endorsed by the policy committee even though it was known that the operators could avoid  the pending strike by merely granting a conference to the union officials.  Even after the union dropped the demand for recognition. Osgood and the policy committee refused all offers of mediation by either private, state or federal entities throughout the course of the strike.  This position was supported by John D Rockefeller, Jr. until the following September when the CF&I officials decided to break with Osgood and settle the strike on the basis of President Wilson’s plan that included the establishment of grievance committees at each mine.

Osgood vowed never to submit to arbitration of labor disputes, and he remained steadfast in his determination to destroy the UMWA once and for all.  His strategy was to follow the past procedure for breaking strikes and combating unions.  This procedure included the following: to concede those union demands that were already legislated by law or strongly demanded by the public (the eight-hour day, mine safety regulations and the abolition of scrip); to evict strikers from their company homes and drive them from the camps as soon as a strike began; to recruit European immigrants as strikebreakers; to hire and arm mine guards to protect the mines and keep them open by escorting strikebreakers into the camps to work the mines; to convince the governor to send the state militia into the strike zone at the first sign of violence;  to use the militia and mine guards to keep the mines open and to round up and deport all strikers remaining in the area; and to obtain indictments through the courts of the union leaders for violations of conspiracy laws or murder.  With public opinion generally behind them and overwhelming resources at their disposal, the operators believed that they could quickly break the strike if Governor Ammons committed state militia troops to the strike zone to help the armed mine guards keep the mines operating with strikebreakers.

The operators, however, greatly underestimated the determination of the strikers.  They had persuaded themselves that only a small percentage of the miners would go out on strike, although Lamont Bowers conceded that it was not always possible to know what the miners were thinking.  “So far as we can learn,” he told Rockefeller, “they are satisfied and contented, but the constant dogging of their heels by agitators, together with the muckraking magazines and trust-busting political shysters, has a mighty influence over the ignorant foreigners who make up the great mass of our ten thousand miners.” 

To the surprise of the operators and the public at large, thousands of strikers constituting 90 to 95 percent of the entire Colorado coal mine work force left the camps in a pouring rain on the day of the strike, either to leave the state or to occupy tents that the union had set up in eight locations on land rented just outside of company property.  There the strikers were prepared to stay until the operators met the demands of the UMWA to whom they had entrusted their welfare.

Author Darrell Munsell  is Professor Emeritus, West Texas A&M University,.  He retired to the Crystal River Valley  in 1997, with his wife, Jane.  They were both very active in the Redstone Historical society as well as historic preservation work and members of several regional historical societies. He is the author of five books, including: From Redstone to Ludlow: John Cleveland Osgood’s Struggle against the United Mine Workers of America,  Colorado Artist Jack Roberts: Painting the West,  Protecting a Valley and Saving a River: The Crystal Valley Environmental Protection Association. 

The Munsells moved back to Canyon, Texas in 2021 to be near the West Texas A&M University library.  In October 2026, Darrell released a new book on a new subject, published by the University of Kansas Press – ARCHITECTS of AUTHORITARIANISM

For more book information –https://kansaspress.ku.edu/9780700642854/#:~:text=Architects%20of%20Authoritarianism,Sales%20Date%3A%20October%202026